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Abstract 
China’s accession to the WTO and accelerated global emergence will dramatically change 
trade patterns with the Pacific region and exert important influence on its trilateral 
relationship with Japan and the United States. Because of its size and stage of development, 
China will play two roles in the region with unusual prominence. First, it will stiffen 
regional export competition in a broad spectrum of products. Second, the size of China’s 
growing internal market will make it, by 2015, the largest trading nation in East Asia. Thus 
China interposes itself between the rest of East Asia and the U.S.-Japan market as an export 
competitor and magnet for imports. The objective of this paper is to evaluate this 
phenomenon empirically and elucidate the regional and domestic adjustments that might 
ensue. We find that China, Japan and the United States would gain substantially from a 
trilateral free trade agreement, and they could realize most of the residual gains from 
globalization. We contrast this with China’s involvement in less inclusive East Asian FTAs, 
and we find that this would benefit smaller member economies (e.g., ASEAN countries), but 
not China itself. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, a new landscape of economic relations has begun to emerge 
in the Pacific Basin. As conflicts and rivalries between the United States and Japan appear 
to have receded and the agenda of globalization has advanced, more countries are 
embracing outward economic orientation and open multilateralism as a means of 
accelerating domestic economic growth. Most prominent of the later entrants in the 
regional arena is China, whose domestic economic reforms have led it to record growth 
rates, dramatically accelerating export expansion and sharply raising living standards. 
With the entry to the WTO, China is likely to speed up its domestic and external 
liberalization. 
The emergence of China as a major trading partner has important implications for 
the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship in particular and the evolution of Asian Pacific trade 
patterns generally. Because of its size and stage of development, China will play two roles 
in the region with unusual prominence. First, it is likely to strengthen its export 
competitiveness in a wider range of products. Second, the size of China’s growing internal 
market will make it the largest East Asian importer of East Asian goods. Thus China 
interposes itself between the rest of East Asia and the U.S.-Japan as an export and import 
competitor, respectively. The Asia’s newly industrialized economies (NIEs) have played 
such a role in the past, but none are comparable to China in size or scope of potential 
regional influence. 
Clearly, the emergence of China into this new economic prominence will be most 
successful if it can be accommodated into a framework of regional cooperation, 
particularly with respect to the most influential economies, the United States and Japan. It 
is not enough to simply argue that all three should get along, however, since the evolution 
of domestic economic conditions and external trade patterns will exert important 
influences on policy in all three countries. A more realistic way to promote the smooth 
evolution of open multilateralism in the region would be to clearly elucidate the interests 
and potential rewards to participating countries. 
However, in the past decade the number of regional integration agreements (RIAs) 
has proliferated rapidly. Japan and Singapore signed a bilateral free trade agreement in 
January 2002, and both countries are actively discussing similar arrangements with other 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN+3 group, consisting of the ASEAN countries, 
Japan, China/Hong Kong, and Korea, has emerged primarily to provide a framework for 
establishing East Asian leadership and influence on regional and international affairs 
(Drysdale, 2002). The trends in negotiating for new RIA are likely to continue. 
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Whether regional agreements are a facilitating intermediate step towards global 
free trade or a hindrance to greater global trade liberalization is a hotly debated issue.1 
Proponents for regional integration argue that RIAs encourage member countries to 
liberalize beyond the level committed by multilateral negotiations and that they promote 
developing countries to carry out trade reforms and stimulate foreign direct investment 
from developed countries.2  In addition, a regional agreement makes it easier to handle the 
tougher negotiating issues (Kahler, 1995). Opponents worry that the proliferation of RIAs 
is likely to undermine the multilateral trading system and that beneficiaries of RIAs might 
form a political lobby to deter further multilateral liberalization (e.g., Bhagwati, 1995; 
Levy, 1997; Srinivasan, 1998ab; Panagariya, 1999). 
Empirical evidence on benefits and costs of RIAs suggests that trade creation 
exceeds trade diversion in almost all RIAs (Robinson and Thierfelder, 1999). The positive 
effect on economic welfare resulting from the European Union (EU) and North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is supported by Baldwin et al. (1995), Brown et al. 
(1992), Harrison et al. (1996), and Roland-Holst et al. (1992). However, Yeats (1998) 
finds that during 1988-94 Mercosur countries experienced significant trade diversion when 
their intra-Mercosur trade increased sharply. 
In this paper, we evaluate the effects of multilateral and regional trade policy 
scenarios that are particularly relevant to the United States, Japan, and China using the 
LINKAGE model (van der Mensbrugghe, 2001). The next section provides the trends in 
trilateral trade among the three countries during the 1980-2001 period. An overview of the 
model is given in section 3, followed by a brief description of scenarios and assessments 
of computational results in section 4. The final section summarizes the main policy 
conclusions. 
 
2. Trilateral Trade among China, Japan and the United States, 1980-2001 
Figures 1-2 provide trends in China and Hong Kong’s shares of merchandize trade 
with Japan, other East Asia, the United States, and each other (i.e., intra-China-Hong 
Kong trade). Three arresting features are readily observed from these figures. First, trade 
between China and Hong Kong as the ratio of their total trade surged from 12-15 percent 
in 1980 to about one-third in 1991-92, before falling off to about one-fourth in the past 
several years. Significant portions of Hong Kong’s trade with China are entrepôt trade or 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Krueger (1999) and Laird (1999). 
2 Ethier (1998) suggests that small-country members are induced to lock in their liberalized trade regimes 
and that RIAs are congruent with further multilateral liberalization. 
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re-exports (Hong Kong, Census and Statistics Department, various years). Until the early 
1990s, China-Hong Kong trade as the share of their total trade continued to rise as China’s 
growing trade with East Asian countries, particularly with Korea and Taiwan, passed 
through Hong Kong. 
Second, the United States has been the largest export destination country for China 
and Hong Kong, and the share of Chinese (including Hong Kong) exports to the United 
States has increased in the past decade. In contrast, the share of its imports from the 
United States has steadily declined over the 1980-2001 period, thereby widening China’s 
trade surplus with the United States in recent years.  
Third, the share of Chinese imports from Japan has also declined from the mid-
1980s although Japan still remains the largest single exporter to China.  However, a group 
of other East Asian countries’ exports to China surpassed Japanese exports in 1990 and 
continued to grow very rapidly in the past decade. The shares of Chinese exports to both 
Japan and other East Asia have remained relatively stable since 1980. 
 
 
Figure 1. Trends in China & Hong Kong's Exports to
Japan, Other East Asia, and the United States
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Sources: International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development 
(2002); International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics 
Yearbook, various issues. 
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Figure 2. Trends in China & Hong Kong's Imports from
Japan, Other East Asia, and the United States
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Sources: Same as Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figures 3-4 provide trends in Japan’s shares of merchandize trade with China and 
Hong Kong, other East Asia, and the United States during the period 1980-2001. Similar 
to China, the largest share of Japanese exports is destined to the United States, peaking at 
39 percent in 1986 and hovering around 30 percent since 1990. During the 1985-1996 
period, the share of Japanese exports to other East Asia surged from 13 percent to 31 
percent. Its exports to crisis-hit Asian countries fell drastically in 1997 and 1998 before 
they recovered in 1999 and 2000. Since 1990, the share of Japanese exports to China has 
steadily increased.3 
 
                                                 
3 The fact that Japan’s exports to China and other East Asia has increased trade during the 1985-96 period 
might be explained by the rapid average growth of the importing countries (Frankel, 1993; Frankel et al., 
1998). Bilateral trade would be affected by the partner country’s growth rate of real GDP and changes in 
relative openness. 
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Figure 3. Trends in Japan's Exports to China & Hong Kong,
Other East Asia, and the United States
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Sources: Same as Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 4. Trends in Japan's Imports from China & Hong
Kong, Other East Asia, and the United States
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Share of Japan's imports from China & HK (%)
Share of Japan's imports from Other East Asia (%)
Share of Japan's imports from the US (%)
  
Sources: Same as Figure 1. 
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On the import side, the share of Japanese imports from China increased 
dramatically from 6 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 2001. The shares of imports from 
other East Asia and the United States remained relatively stable until 1998. During 1998-
2001, the imports from other East Asia increased rapidly while those from the United 
States stagnated. Comparisons of the trend in the shares of Chinese exports to Japan in 
Figure 1 and that of Japanese imports from China (including Hong Kong) in Figure 4, as 
well as comparisons of the trend in the shares of Chinese imports from Japan in Figures 2 
and that of Japanese exports to China in Figure 3, make evident that China (including 
Hong Kong)’s trade grew much more rapidly than Japan’s during the 1980-2001 period.  
Since trends in the U.S. share of merchandize trade with China (including Hong 
Kong) and Japan may be deduced from Figures 1-4, we omit corresponding graphs for the 
United States. Japan is the second largest trading partner for the United States after 
Canada, whereas China is the third largest supplier of U.S. imports. Both countries have 
been running extremely large trade surpluses with the United States, accounting for 37-70 
percent of U.S. merchandize trade deficits during the 1990-2000 period (International 
Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook). Japan was the largest bilateral 
deficit partner-country for the United States until 1999, but China became the largest 
deficit partner-country in 2000, accounting for 19 percent of U.S. merchandize trade 
deficits of $476 billion that year. 
 
3. Overview of the Model 
The model used in this study is a dynamic global CGE model developed by van der 
Mensbrugghe (2001). All sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive and operate 
under constant returns to scale. Production in each sector is modeled by a series of nested 
CES production functions, which are intended to represent the different substitution and 
complementarity relations across the various inputs in each sector. The CES nests for 
production archetype in goods and services other than crops and livestock are depicted in 
Figure 5. 4  At the top nest, production is formed by the combination of aggregate 
intermediate demand other than energy (ND) and value added plus energy (VA). The 
second nest consists of two nodes. The first node decomposes aggregate intermediate 
demand into sectoral demand for goods and services. The second node decomposes VA 
between demand for labor (L) and demand for human capital, physical capital, energy, and 
sector-specific factor composite (HKTE). The third and subsequent nodes are decomposed 
by a similar fashion, as illustrated in Figure 5. 
                                                 
4 See van der Mensbrugghe (2001) for the CES nests for production archetypes in crops and livestock. 
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Figure 5. Production Nesting in the Manufacturing and Services Sectors 
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Labor can have three different skill levels: unskilled, skilled, and highly skilled. 
The first two are substitutable and combined in a CES aggregation function as a single 
labor bundle. Highly skilled labor is combined with capital to form a physical plus human 
capital bundle. 
In each period, the supply of primary factors – capital, labor, and land – is 
generally predetermined. The supply of land is assumed to be sensitive to the 
contemporaneous price of land, however. Land is assumed to be partially mobile across 
agricultural sectors. Thus rates of return are sector-specific, but sectoral land supply reacts 
to changes in relative rates of return. Some of the natural resource sectors also have a 
sector-specific factor whose contemporaneous supply is price sensitive. The model 
includes adjustment rigidities. An important feature is the distinction between old and new 
capital goods. In addition, capital is assumed to be partially mobile, reflecting differences 
in the marketability of capital goods across sectors. Labor and population growth are 
exogenous. Labor within each skill category is perfectly mobile across sectors. 
All income generated by economic activity is assumed to be distributed to 
consumers. A single representative consumer (or household) allocates optimally his/her 
disposable income among the consumer goods and saving. The consumption/saving 
decision is static: saving is treated as a good and its amount is determined simultaneously 
with the demands for the other goods. The price of saving is set arbitrarily equal to the 
average price of consumer goods. Investment is driven by aggregate saving, or the sum of 
household, government, and foreign savings. We assume that foreign saving is exogenous 
and that the ratio of government expenditures to GDP remains constant in each region 
over time. 
Products are differentiated by region of origin and modeled as imperfect 
substitutes. On the import side, this is reflected by the implementation of the so-called 
Armington assumption, where a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specification is 
used to incorporate imperfect substitution of imported goods with respect to domestically 
produced goods. A symmetric specification is used to model export supply, the latter being 
implemented with constant elasticity of transformation (CET) functions. Trade measures 
are fully bilateral and include both export and import taxes/subsidies. Trade and transport 
margins are also included; therefore world prices reflect the difference between FOB and 
CIF pricing.  
The model is calibrated to a given baseline from 1997 to 2015. The per capita GDP 
growth rates are broadly consistent with the World Bank’s long-term forecast. 
Productivity is calibrated in the baseline to achieve the desired GDP trends. Several 
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assumptions underline the calibration of productivity. Agricultural productivity is 
exogenous, user-determined and varies across regions. Manufacturing productivity growth 
is assumed to be higher than services productivity growth. An economywide productivity 
factor is calibrated to achieve the given GDP target, and productivity growth is assumed to 
be labor-augmenting.  
 
4. Scenarios and Results 
To assess the global consequences of China’s emergence in the context of 
alternative regional arrangements, the following four counterfactual policy scenarios are 
considered: 
 
1) Global trade liberalization (GTL) – complete abolition of import tariffs and export 
subsidies 
 
2) Northeast Asia Free Trade Area (NEAFTA) – free trade among Japan, China/Hong 
Kong, Korea, and Taiwan 
 
3) ASEAN+3 – Free trade among the ASEAN countries, Japan, China/Hong Kong, 
and Korea 
 
4) U.S.-Japan-China free trade – Accelerating bilateral phase-ins to finish by 2005 
 
5) U.S.-China-Japan free trade with strong complementarity – Scenario 4 with 
accelerated bilateral FDI from the United States and Japan to China. Specifically, 
China receives $8 billion, $16 billion, and $24 billion additional FDI compared 
with the baseline in 2002, 2003, and 2004-2010, respectively, where the United 
States and Japan each pays one-half of these amounts. Resumption of baseline 
flows after 2010. 
 
Phase-in periods for global and regional trade liberalization are 2005-2010 for the first 
three scenarios and 2002-2005 for scenarios 4 and 5. 
 
4.1 Effects on Equivalent Variation National Income 
Aggregate income gains and/or losses summarize the extent trade distortions are 
hindering growth prospects and the ability of economies to use the gains to help those 
whose income could potentially decline. We compared the four counterfactual scenarios 
with the baseline situation in the terminal year, 2015, using a measure of compensated or 
equivalent variation aggregate national income. Real income is summarized by Hicksian 
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equivalent variation (EV). This represents the income consumers would be willing to 
forego to achieve post-reform well-being (up) compared to baseline well-being (ub) at 
baseline prices (pb): 
 ( ) ( )bbpb upEupEEV ,, −=  
where E represents the expenditure function to achieve utility level u given a vector of 
prices p (superscript b represents baseline levels, and p the post-reform levels). The model 
uses the extended linear expenditure system (ELES), which incorporates savings in the 
consumer’s utility function (Lluch, 1973; Howe, 1975). The ELES expenditure function is 
easy to evaluate at each point in time.5  The discounted real income uses the following 
formula: 
 ( ) ( )∑∑
=
−
=
−=
2015
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t
d
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t
t
a
t
t YEVCEV ββ  
where CEV is the cumulative measure of real income (as a percent of baseline income), β 
is the discount factor (equal to 1/(1+r) where r is the subjective discount rate), Yd is real 
disposable income, and EVa is adjusted equivalent variation. The adjustment to EV 
extracts the component measuring the contribution of household saving, since this 
represents future consumption. Without the adjustment, the EV measure would be double 
counting. The saving component is included in the EV evaluation for the terminal year.  
Table 1 summarizes these aggregate results. Clearly, the GTL or full WTO 
scenario is the most attractive for all countries considered except China and Japan. To be 
realistic, however, the WTO process is fraught with uncertainty about the scope, depth, 
and timeliness of multilateral commitments to abolish trade barriers. This kind of 
uncertainty has been an important impetus to regional agreements, particularly those 
between small groups of nations who find consensus, implementation, and monitoring 
easier.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Unlike the OECD treatment of EV in previous studies (e.g., Burniaux et al., 1992), we use baseline prices 
in each year rather than base year prices. 
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Table 1. Effects on Equivalent Variation National Income  
 (Deviations from the baseline in 2015) 
    
 Senariosa)    
      
 GTL  NEAFTA ASEAN+3 Trilat  Trilat+FDI    
 Absolute changes (billions of 1997 US$)  
United States 22.4  -3.3  -3.6  19.0  18.6  
Japan 55.8  17.9  24.1  56.7  62.6  
China/Hong Kong 29.2  -2.3  -1.2  78.4  89.7  
Korea 19.6  14.1  16.5  -2.0  -2.0  
Taiwan 8.7  9.5  -5.6  -3.2  -3.1  
Singapore 7.3  -0.6  6.5  -0.2  -0.2  
Other ASEANb) 20.1  -4.5  19.6  -4.8  -4.7  
Canada and ANZc) 8.2  -0.2  -0.4  -1.6  -1.5  
Western Europe 75.5  1.2  1.8  4.4  4.9  
Rest of the world 70.0  -2.9  -3.5  -12.0  -11.9  
Total 316.8  28.9  54.3  134.6  152.3  
 
 Percentage changes  
United States 0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  
Japan 1.4  0.4  0.6  1.4  1.5  
China/Hong Kong 1.2  -0.1  0.0  3.2  3.7  
Korea 2.4  1.7  2.0  -0.3  -0.2  
Taiwan 1.6  1.8  -1.1  -0.6  -0.6  
Singapore 5.9  -0.5  5.3  -0.2  -0.2  
Other ASEANb) 2.3  -0.5  2.3  -0.6  -0.6  
Canada and ANZc) 0.7  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  
Western Europe 0.9  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  
Rest of the world 1.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  
Total 0.9  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.4     
Notes:  
a) Scenarios: GTL: global trade liberalization; Northeast Asia Free Trade Area (Japan, China, Korea, and 
Taiwan); ASEAN+3: ASEAN, Japan, China, and Korea; NEAFTA: Trilat: free trade among the United 
States, Japan, and China; Trilat+FDI: Net FDI between China, Japan, and the United States is modified from 
baseline. In 2002, 2003, 2004-2010, China receives respectively $8, $16, $24 billion additional FDI 
compared to the baseline. Japan and the United States pay each one-half of these amounts. Resumption of 
baseline flows after 2010. 
b) Only Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam are included in Other ASEAN. Brunei, 
Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are excluded because of the data constraints. 
c) Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
 
 
The United States would clearly prefer global liberalization to any of the regional 
arrangements under consideration, but it is essential to note that the trilateral arrangements 
could be very attractive stepping stones to globalization. In scenarios 4 and 5, about 80 
percent of GTL’s benefits would be obtained in exchange for liberalizing only two 
components of U.S. bilateral trade. The arrangement would also be incentive compatible 
for the other two countries, since each enjoys greater benefits under Trilateralism than 
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under GTL. In the case of China, the benefits are up to three times greater. The main 
reason for this is trade diversion, where China enjoys privileged access to the U.S. market 
at the expense of many other export competitors. These results put two strong negotiating 
tools in the hands of the United States, a carrot for China and Japan and a stick for the rest 
of East Asia.  
It is clear that Trilateralism also induces significant trade creation since the income 
gains of Japan and China are not nearly offset by losses elsewhere in the world. Again, 
this supports the idea that Trilateralism might be a desirable intermediate step to 
globalization. This arrangement clearly works because of the diversity of the economies in 
question, allowing significant new specialization and gains from trade. This is an 
important reason why the trilateral arrangement dominates more conventional and widely 
discussed East Asian regional agreements like NEAFTA and ASEAN+3. 
In percent of GDP terms, it is clear that the stakes are much higher for China and 
Japan than for the United States. For this reason, one might expect the impetus for such an 
arrangement to arise in East Asia. That neither China nor Japan has initiated a talk on 
trilateral free trade agreement might be because China is concerned with balancing 
alliances across East Asia, Japan is too preoccupied with China’s emergence, or because it 
is politically infeasible to pursue this kind of agreement at present. On economic grounds, 
there appears to be relatively little trade exclusion resulting from Trilateralism, and there 
is an appropriate response for other East Asian economies; i.e., moving on to global trade 
liberalization. 
Finally, it is especially noteworthy that the two East Asian regional arrangements 
appear to be detrimental to China in aggregate EV terms. This result is discussed in greater 
detail in Roland-Holst and van der Mensbrugghe (2002), and it portends significant 
incentive problems for new trade blocs in the region. The basic problem for China is the 
scale of its export capacity. Joining an East Asian FTA would divert its trade into a 
smaller market, leading to adverse terms-of-trade effects. China is much better off going 
directly toward globalization, as it is doing with its WTO commitments or, at a minimum, 
crafting regional arrangements with market (like the United States and Japan) large 
enough to absorb its burgeoning export potential. From our results, it is clear why other 
East Asian economies might want to entice China into a regional FTA, but it is not at all 
clear why China would accede to it. 
Between the two trilateral scenarios, the basic difference is a transfer of the capital 
stock and the trade growth that ensues from a higher production capacity. FDI flows from 
the United States and Japan into China would expand the production possibilities in China 
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and increase competitiveness. This increases trade with both Japan and the United States, 
increasing aggregate welfare for the former but, in the net, reducing it for the latter. In 
other words, for Japan the trade growth effect more than offsets the hollowing out effect, 
but for the United States the opposite occurs. 
 
4.2 Effects on Bilateral and World Trade Flows 
As might be expected given the competitive nature of the Pacific Basin economy, 
FTA in this region can induce substantial trade diversion. This is particularly the case for 
arrangements that include economies like China and Japan with relatively high prior 
protection. Privileged access to these markets would confer significant market access, both 
new and appropriated, on other FTA members. To better understand these compositional 
adjustments, Tables 2-4 present bilateral trade flow adjustments (in some cases with 
respect to aggregate trade partners like the EU) resulting from global trade liberalization, 
free trade among the ASEAN+3 countries, and trilateral liberalization with no change in 
FDI flows. Figures are given in deviations from the baseline scenario in 2015 in terms of 
billions of 1997 US dollars (top panels) and percentages (bottom panels). 
To begin, it is noteworthy that even the GTL scenario entails some competitive 
crowding out. Trade adjustments in this scenario are obviously driven by prior protection 
levels, and even though there is substantial global trade growth and aggregate export 
growth for every country and group considered, detailed patterns of trade still exhibit 
some diversion because of differences in net real exchange rate adjustments. For example, 
China has higher than average prior protection, implying that its market will open more 
than average, but also that its real exchange rate will depreciate vis-à-vis the average 
currency. The latter factor gives Chinese exports an across the board competitive 
advantage, allowing them to appropriate new market share faster than the rate of trade 
growth. 
When this happens in relatively large liberalization scenarios, China benefits 
substantially and some of its trading partners give up significant exports, although these 
detailed market losses are offset by aggregate trade growth. In less inclusive regional 
arrangements, two factors come into play. First, China’s accelerated import and export 
growth run into adverse terms-of-trade adjustments because of trade diversion within the 
regional market. Second, the more restrictive agreements offer less aggregate trade 
expansion, so that competitive bilateral crowding out is not offset and some countries 
actually suffer declining aggregate trade. 
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The trade flow tables reward closer inspection, particularly to obtain deeper 
insights about bilateral interactions and incentive properties. For example, in most cases 
China is running a significant trade surplus with the United States and a substantial deficit 
with East Asia other than Japan, implying a transitive surplus for its regional partners. 
While this might be a desirable property from the East Asian perspective, it puts China in 
a difficult position as a member of less inclusive East Asian arrangements. This is 
because, to join such an arrangement, China is implicitly expected to expand exports 
outside the region by significantly reduce extra-regional imports. This might complicate 
bilateral relations (particularly with respect to the OECD countries) for a newly emergent 
WTO member.  
Of greatest immediate interest to this paper is the trilateral scenario, the trade flow 
results of which are given in Table 4. Here we see compositional adjustments that include 
substantial trade creation among the three principals, as well as significant trade diversion. 
While the former outweighs the latter, the incidence of trade diversion is such that we 
might expect vigorous challenges to emergent Trilateralism in the Pacific. While trade 
growth is about three times the total amount of trade diversion, every country and region 
outside the agreement experiences an absolute decline in aggregate exports. This strong 
and uniform diversion is again a result of the relatively high prior protection in China and 
Japan. For this reason, it is reasonable to expect mitigation of this effect over time, at least 
from the Chinese side, as WTO conformity levels the playing field for countries outside 
the trilateral agreement. 
Why does Trilateralism look so much better to China than other regional 
arrangements? The answer, as suggested already, is partly market size. Another important 
aspect, however, is economic diversity. Despite Japan and Korea’s OECD status, the 
Trilateral scenario is the only FTA we consider that can truly be termed North-South. This 
is as much because of prior trade patterns as domestic economic structure. By joining with 
the United States, China gets access to more diversified import demand and export supply 
than is available in East Asia, and on a scale that attenuates terms-of-trade effects. This 
kind of diversification completes international networks of comparative advantages and is 
one of the primary attractions of North-South regionalism.6 
Even with strong trade diversion, does Pacific Trilateralism provide a solid 
stepping stone to globalization? To the extent that it accelerates trade between the three 
largest economies in the region, such an agreement can advance the case for greater global 
interdependence. Whether or not Trilateralism is really on the path to globalization, 
                                                 
6 The case for North-South regionalism has been strenuously argued along these lines in, among others, 
World Bank (2000). 
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however, depends upon the nature of the structural adjustments ensuing from both trade 
regimes. A key question is whether the composition of sectoral output, factor use, and 
trade arising from Trilateralism are structurally consistent with patterns of comparative 
advantage that would emerge in the same countries under long-run WTO implementation. 
This question can only be answered conclusively by detailed analysis of sectoral 
information, the next stage of our work in progress. 
For the present, the most important lesson drawn from our work is that the largest 
economies in the region have a strong incentive to take the lead in any regional 
liberalization initiatives. For the United States, Japan, and China, trilateral liberalization 
dominates any regional arrangements including only one of two of these players. Other 
economies in the region have strong incentive to enlist them in less inclusive 
arrangements, but it is not at all clear on economic grounds why they would accept. 
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Table 2. Effects on Bilateral Trade Flows resulting from Global Trade Liberalization  
 (Deviations from the baseline in 2015) 
 
  Importers       $1997 billion
Exporters   USA JPN CHN KOR TWN SGP OASE CANZ EUR ROW Total 
United States USA 18.9 35.3 15.3 7.6 0.2 7.8 -13.2 32.2 29.8 134.0 
Japan JPN 5.6 53.9 10.7 4.6 -2.5 19.4 7.4 20.0 25.8 144.8 
China/Hong Kong CHN 56.4 33.2 18.3 18.6 8.5 3.5 28.8 13.8 61.8 79.2 322.1 
Korea KOR -0.2 5.1 37.7 1.2 -0.4 13.8 1.5 5.8 17.3 81.7 
Taiwan TWN -0.8 -0.3 39.2 0.7 -1.0 4.7 0.4 1.0 2.2 46.1 
Singapore SGP -3.4 -0.2 12.5 0.5 0.6  8.7 -0.7 -1.0 0.5 17.7 
Other ASEAN OASE 16.7 15.2 21.6 3.5 4.2 3.4 12.6 2.8 28.2 16.6 124.7 
Canada and ANZ CANZ -22.0 20.1 4.7 -2.0 1.0 -0.4 -1.0 -3.4 30.0 11.0 38.0 
Western Europe EUR 45.5 21.3 46.3 18.0 14.8 4.6 16.8 20.7 -205.2 180.2 162.9 
Rest of the world ROW 36.5 31.6 28.5 19.7 2.9 12.4 8.3 8.8 225.3 247.2 621.2 
World total Total 134.3 145.0 297.9 85.0 45.2 19.9 119.9 38.1 197.9 609.9 1693.1 
             
   Importers        Percentages
Exporters   USA JPN CHN KOR TWN SGP OASE CANZ EUR ROW Total 
United States USA 12.6 33.0 21.7 14.3 0.5 9.7 -4.7 7.4 7.2 8.2 
Japan JPN 2.9 43.5 23.1 8.9 -8.1 23.7 24.9 14.0 29.0 18.4 
China/Hong Kong CHN 27.0 31.2 37.3 57.4 38.4 13.8 69.1 48.1 33.9 61.3 39.0 
Korea KOR -0.3 20.3 50.6 10.7 -4.8 41.9 13.8 11.8 26.8 25.2 
Taiwan TWN -1.4 -1.8 45.4 12.8 -10.1 21.5 5.0 2.3 12.9 17.2 
Singapore SGP -8.6 -1.2 24.4 7.0 4.9  14.5 -7.8 -2.2 1.5 6.5 
Other ASEAN OASE 15.9 23.9 47.2 19.5 20.6 5.3 32.6 13.8 23.7 28.9 22.6 
Canada and ANZ CANZ -7.2 49.7 15.0 -9.7 9.1 -6.0 -4.8 -19.9 43.8 23.5 6.7 
Western Europe EUR 11.6 13.2 35.1 27.4 37.3 10.3 15.6 20.6 -9.4 25.3 4.1 
Rest of the world ROW 8.8 27.0 31.0 31.8 16.8 28.0 14.6 20.3 35.7 48.1 31.2 
World total Total 7.6 20.8 37.6 25.9 19.1 7.2 22.1 7.0 5.1 29.3 15.2 
 
 
 18
Table 3. Effects on Bilateral Trade Flows resulting from Free Trade among ASEAN+3 Countries 
 (Deviations from the baseline in 2015) 
 
  Importers       $1997 billion
Exporters   USA JPN CHN KOR TWN SGP OASE CANZ EUR ROW Total 
United States USA -4.4 -16.6 -5.0 -0.1 2.6 -7.5 2.1 5.3 3.3 -20.5 
Japan93 JPN -20.2 91.0 21.8 -5.4 -2.3 36.5 -2.9 -13.1 -7.6 97.8 
China/Hong Kong CHN 9.2 51.9 25.7 31.1 0.6 2.6 34.7 1.2 10.0 3.9 170.8 
Korea KOR -6.8 14.8 57.5 -1.9 -1.0 15.6 -1.7 -7.2 -10.4 59.0 
Taiwan TWN 4.2 1.5 -18.5 -0.3 0.9 -3.9 0.6 3.1 1.4 -11.0 
Singapore SGP -4.0 0.2 17.7 1.6 -1.2 13.3 -1.0 -5.0 -4.4 17.3 
Other ASEAN OASE -2.1 34.2 39.6 8.6 -0.5 1.5 18.9 -0.8 -1.2 -2.7 95.5 
Canada and ANZ CANZ 1.3 -0.2 -4.0 -0.5 -0.2 0.7 -2.0 0.2 0.6 0.5 -3.5 
Western Europe EUR -1.7 1.5 -15.6 0.3 -1.2 3.6 -9.0 -0.6 -7.6 0.0 -30.1 
Rest of the world ROW 1.5 -5.0 -17.7 0.0 -0.6 8.6 -5.9 0.1 -1.8 1.1 -19.7 
World total Total -18.6 94.5 159.2 57.5 -10.5 17.3 90.8 -2.8 -16.9 -15.0 355.6 
             
  Importers        Percentages
Exporters   USA JPN CHN KOR TWN SGP OASE CANZ EUR ROW Total 
United States USA -2.9 -15.5 -7.1 -0.2 6.2 -9.3 0.7 1.2 0.8 -1.3 
Japan JPN -10.5 73.4 46.9 -10.5 -7.3 44.7 -9.9 -9.2 -8.5 12.4 
China/Hong Kong CHN 4.4 48.7 52.5 96.1 2.5 10.5 83.0 4.1 5.5 3.0 20.7 
Korea KOR -14.5 58.7 77.3 -16.7 -10.6 47.5 -15.7 -14.7 -16.2 18.2 
Taiwan TWN 7.2 7.6 -21.4 -5.8 9.6 -18.1 7.2 7.5 7.8 -4.1 
Singapore SGP -10.2 1.5 34.6 23.2 -10.4 22.0 -11.3 -11.0 -13.0 6.4 
Other ASEAN OASE -2.0 53.7 86.6 47.5 -2.5 2.3 49.0 -4.1 -1.0 -4.7 17.3 
Canada and ANZ CANZ 0.4 -0.4 -12.6 -2.5 -1.7 10.5 -9.6 1.2 0.9 1.0 -0.6 
Western Europe EUR -0.4 1.0 -11.8 0.5 -2.9 8.1 -8.3 -0.6 -0.4 0.0 -0.8 
Rest of the world ROW 0.4 -4.3 -19.2 0.0 -3.4 19.4 -10.3 0.1 -0.3 0.2 -1.0 
World total Total -1.1 13.6 20.1 17.5 -4.4 6.3 16.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.7 3.2 
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Table 4. Effects on Bilateral Trade Flows resulting from U.S.-Japan-China Free Trade 
 (Deviations from the baseline in 2015) 
 
  Importers       $1997 billion
Exporters   USA JPN CHN KOR TWN SGP OASE CANZ EUR ROW Total 
United States USA 57.5 87.5 -3.6 -3.1 -2.4 -3.8 -9.7 -20.0 -20.1 82.4 
Japan JPN 11.2 124.2 -4.3 -5.2 -3.7 -7.9 -2.7 -14.4 -9.1 88.1 
China/Hong Kong CHN 79.6 35.3 27.4 2.4 1.2 1.7 2.0 2.4 15.2 5.1 172.3 
Korea KOR -0.1 -0.5 -13.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.5 1.7 2.2 -8.9 
Taiwan TWN 1.4 1.0 -16.8 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.6 2.5 1.0 -9.0 
Singapore SGP -1.2 0.6 -2.0 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -3.6 
Other ASEAN OASE -5.1 -3.8 -6.5 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.3 2.3 0.7 -10.9 
Canada and ANZ CANZ -2.6 -1.2 -5.3 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.0 -8.3 
Western Europe EUR -2.5 2.1 -14.2 -1.3 -1.0 -0.1 -1.0 0.0 -11.0 -6.3 -35.3 
Rest of the world ROW -5.2 -7.1 -18.6 -0.8 -0.5 0.2 -0.6 0.7 0.3 0.0 -31.6 
World total Total 75.5 83.9 162.2 -7.1 -8.6 -2.9 -10.3 -7.8 -23.0 -27.0 235.1 
             
  Importers        Percentages
Exporters   USA JPN CHN KOR TWN SGP OASE CANZ EUR ROW Total 
United States USA 38.4 81.8 -5.0 -5.9 -5.7 -4.7 -3.4 -4.6 -4.9 5.0 
Japan JPN 5.8 100.2 -9.2 -10.2 -11.8 -9.7 -9.1 -10.1 -10.3 11.2 
China/Hong Kong CHN 38.0 33.1 55.8 7.4 5.5 6.7 4.9 8.2 8.3 4.0 20.8 
Korea KOR -0.2 -1.8 -17.8 0.9 2.3 0.4 4.5 3.5 3.5 -2.8 
Taiwan TWN 2.3 5.2 -19.5 4.6 5.3 3.1 7.1 5.9 5.6 -3.4 
Singapore SGP -3.0 4.3 -4.0 0.1 0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.4 -1.4 -1.3 
Other ASEAN OASE -4.9 -6.0 -14.3 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 1.1 -2.0 
Canada and ANZ CANZ -0.8 -2.9 -16.9 0.0 -1.7 1.1 -0.1 1.2 0.9 0.1 -1.5 
Western Europe EUR -0.6 1.3 -10.8 -1.9 -2.6 -0.2 -0.9 0.0 -0.5 -0.9 -0.9 
Rest of the world ROW -1.2 -6.0 -20.3 -1.2 -3.1 0.5 -1.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 -1.6 
World total Total 4.3 12.1 20.5 -2.2 -3.6 -1.1 -1.9 -1.4 -0.6 -1.3 2.1 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
China’s accession to the WTO portends dramatic evolution for the East Asian and 
Pacific economic regions. Over the last two decades, China has established new standards 
for sustained growth and dynamic resource allocation by a large economy, and further 
Chinese domestic and external liberalization will redefine trade relations in ways that are 
only beginning to be understood. Initial reactions of regional partners, who perceive China 
as a strong export competitor and magnet for FDI, have been rather defensive. These 
sentiments could undermine multilateralism and retard the dramatic historical progress of 
regional trade and growth.  
In this paper, we examine how regional trade might evolve under a variety of 
alternative free trade agreements, including a trilateral FTA between the largest regional 
economies, the United States, Japan, and China. Using a dynamic global CGE model, we 
experiment with global trade liberalization, a regional agreement covering Northeast Asia, 
free trade among the ASEAN+3 countries, and a trilateral FTA with and without FDI 
flows from the United States and Japan to China. Our general findings indicate that China 
has made the right decision to move directly toward globalization, but that Trilateralism 
might be a convenient stepping stone in that direction. In particular, we find that a 
trilateral FTA will bring about larger aggregate benefits to China and Japan than global 
trade liberalization and about 80 percent of GTL’s aggregate benefits to the United States, 
although these benefits are likely to come at the expense of extra-regional bilateral 
relations.  
Furthermore, we find that there may be incentive problems for less inclusive East 
Asian FTAs, particularly for the most decisive player, China. An FTA that diverts China’s 
trade into smaller regional markets will occasion adverse terms-of-trade effects for that 
country, partially or more than offsetting gains from piecemeal liberalization. It is 
apparent that smaller economies (e.g., ASEAN countries) would gain by drawing China 
into a regional conclave, but it is not at all clear on economic grounds which China would 
accede to this. A broader set of policy objectives normally animates China’s external 
relations, but a simple economic justification for most of the hypothetical East Asian 
FTAs that include China does not appear to be supported by empirical evidence. 
A trilateral arrangement, by contrast, would provide both the market depth and 
diversity necessary to absorb China’s burgeoning export capacity and meet its complex 
import needs. China’s diversity and scale are also apparently sufficient to meet the needs 
of the Pacific giants, the United States and Japan. Thus we estimate that more efficient 
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allocation of comparative advantage between these three economies would realize very 
substantial gains from trade. Exactly how this relationship would evolve in terms of 
structural adjustment, however, will not be clear until we conduct more detailed sectoral 
analysis. This extension of the present work is non-trivial to its policy implications 
because adversely affected industry lobbies are likely to strongly oppose new trade 
agreements. Suffice for the present to say that Trilateralism appears to offer very 
significant potential gains for the United States, Japan, and China, but that this potential 
will be realized only if the implied sectoral and extra-FTA trade adjustments are politically 
feasible. As we have seen from recent actions by the United States in the steel and 
agricultural sectors, one cannot even take for granted the political feasibility of prior 
commitments to the WTO, let alone a hypothetical FTA. There may be many 
microeconomic obstacles to a Pacific Trilateral FTA, but the stakes do seem high enough 
to justify closer examination of this prospect. 
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